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iNterNatioNal crimiNal triBuNal 
for the former yuGoslaVia
stalling tactics OR Due pROcess? 
tHe kaRaDzic tRail Resumes
On April 8, 2010, the trial of Radovan 
Karadzic resumed after the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) rejected Karadzic’s plea 
stating, “The chamber is not satisfied 
that there has been any violation of the 
accused’s right to a fair trial which would 
justify a stay of the proceedings.” The trial 
was initially set to resume on March 1, 
2010 after a five-month postponement, but 
was adjourned the very next day, pending 
a decision by the Appellate Chambers on 
Karadzic’s appeal of a prior Trial Court 
decision to reject his plea for postpone-
ment. A plea of not guilty was submitted 
on Karadzic’s behalf to the ICTY on March 
3, after Karadzic failed to submit one on 
his own behalf. During the second week of 
the trial’s resumption, the prosecution will 
start to present witness testimony for the 
first time.
The former Bosnian Serb leader is 
charged with genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity, committed during 
the 1992-95 conflict in Bosnia. Karadzic is 
widely regarded as the architect of some of 
the worst atrocities since World War II and 
is blamed, among other things, for the siege 
of Sarajevo and the attack on Srebrenica. 
Known as the Karadzic war, the attack 
on Srebrenica took the lives of over 8,000 
Bosnian Muslim boys and men. The siege 
of Sarajevo lasted 44 months, and death 
toll estimates range as high as 10,000 
people, with 56,000 wounded. Responding 
to these charges, Karadzic has claimed that 
the Western narrative of these events is 
biased, and has called the Serb role in the 
conflict “just and holy.”
Karadzic was arrested and transferred 
to the ICTY in 2008, and his trial was 
initially set to take place in July of that 
year. After several postponements, the 
trial began in November 2009, but was 
again postponed after Karadzic boycotted 
the proceedings. In a letter to the Court, 
Karadzic stated that his decision to exer-
cise his right to self-representation and the 
subsequent difficulties that accompanied 
his decision should not negatively impact 
the fairness of his trial and his time to fully 
prepare. Standby counsel was appointed 
by the Court and afforded five months, till 
March 1, 2010, to prepare for the trial.
The trial has been anticipated as a 
means of exposing long-hidden truths, 
among them the inadequate response of 
UN peacekeepers, who had information 
before the Serbian attack on Srebrenica. 
Others have hailed the trial as a means 
of lifting the shroud of secrecy that has 
masked the systematic and brutal killing 
and mistreatment of Bosnian Muslims in 
Sarajevo. Perhaps most important, the trial 
should present the opportunity for the vic-
tims of these atrocities to be heard.
“Everything the Serbs did is being 
treated as a crime,” Karadzic said during 
his opening statement before the court 
in March. Karadzic described attacks by 
Bosnian Muslims and stated that Bosnian 
Serbs’ actions were a response to these 
attacks and only aimed at military forces. 
Karadzic further stated that the siege of 
Sarajevo was a myth “aimed at drawing 
NATO into the conflict on the side of 
Bosnian Muslims.” While Karadzic claims 
to be preparing the truth about Srebrenica 
and the other allegations, victims of these 
events have stated that he deserves a 
“Nobel Prize for lying.” Despite Karadzic’s 
multiple opportunities to tell his side of the 
story, no witnesses reached the stand at any 
prior hearing. With the recommencement 
of the trial, the Court and the public will 
finally hear victims’ voices. The telling of 
the war’s stories, both those of the victims 
and those of Karadzic, is the chance for 
truths to come out, and perhaps, for some 
of the wounds to begin to heal.
Anna Maitland, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law and an Articles Editor for the 
Human Rights Brief, wrote this column on 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia.
iNterNatioNal crimiNal triBuNal 
for rWaNda
muvunyi veRDict
On February 11, 2009, Trial Chamber 
III of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) handed down a reduced 
sentence of fifteen years to Tharcisse 
Muvunyi for direct and public incitement 
to commit genocide. The amended judg-
ment came from a retrial of a hearing on 
September 12, 2006, when Trial Chamber 
II sentenced Muvunyi to 25 years in prison 
for acts of genocide as well as public 
incitement to commit genocide and other 
inhumane acts.
From 1994 until his departure from 
Rwanda, Muvunyi was the commander of 
the School of Non-Commissioned Officers 
(ESO). Based in the Butare Prefecture, 
he was the highest placed military officer 
in charge of security operations for both 
the prefecture of Butare and Gunkogoro. 
While serving at this post, Muvunyi 
accompanied the then-interim President 
Théodore Sinidikubwabo to the investiture 
ceremony for the new regional administra-
tor. There, Sinidikubwabo made an inflam-
matory speech inciting the killing of Tutsis. 
During Muvunyi’s ICTR hearing, the pros-
ecution argued that because Muvunyi and 
others did not at that point disassociate 
themselves from Sinidikubwabo, they sent 
a message of approval. Muvunyi himself 
then purportedly went on to incite a series 
of groups to kill Tutsis.
The Prosecution alleged that Muvunyi, 
who was in charge of ensuring the safety 
of civilians, did not ensure Tutsis’ safety, 
but rather he and others “fomented, encour-
aged, facilitated and/or approved amongst 
other things, the murders, abductions and 
destruction of property by the Interahamwe 
and the military.” Additionally, Muvunyi 
was also said to have direct involvement 
in the supply and transportation of arms 
meant for the perpetration of attacks on 
Tutsis. He has also been accused of mur-
dering two religious leaders and attacking 
several important buildings, including the 
University of Butare and its hospital, the 
dispensary at Matyaro, the Market Square 
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in Kibilizi, and several others. There are 
also reports that many women and girls 
were raped during the attacks. Muvunyi 
directly ordered many of these attacks 
and, though he knew about other attacks 
because of his rank and position, he took 
no steps to prevent them from occur-
ring. Yet, despite the mounting allegations 
from the Prosecution, the ICTR refused to 
uphold the charge for acts of genocide.
On February 5, 2000, Muvunyi was 
arrested and transported to the ICTR. 
Six years later, on September 12, 2006, 
Muvunyi received his guilty verdict and 
was sentenced to 25 years in prison. On 
August 29, 2008, the Appeals Chamber 
set aside all convictions and the previous 
sentence, ordering a retrial on one charge 
of direct and public incitement to com-
mit genocide. The indictment alleges that 
Muvunyi spoke at a meeting at the Gikore 
Centre in 1994 and incited the killing of 
Tutsis. The retrial recommenced on July 
17, 2009, and on February 11, 2010, the 
Tribunal found Muvunyi guilty of direct 
and public incitement to commit genocide, 
sentencing him to fifteen years in prison, 
with the five years he has already served 
credited to his term.
Shahroo Yazdani, a J.D. candidate at 
the American University Washington 
College of Law, wrote this column on 
the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda for the Human Rights Brief.
JuDgment summaRy: The ProsecuTor 
v. hormisdas NseNgimaNa, case nO. 
ictR-01-69-t
On November 17, 2009, the ICTR 
Trial Chamber I issued its judgment in 
Prosecutor v. Hormisdas Nsengimana. The 
Prosecutor had charged Nsengimana, a 
Catholic priest and Rector of the Collège 
Christ-Roi during the Rwandan genocide, 
with charges of genocide, conspiracy to 
commit genocide, and murder and exter-
mination as crimes against humanity. The 
Chamber acquitted Nsengimana on all 
charges.
Nsengimana was arrested at a mon-
astery in Cameroon in March 2002 and 
transferred to the Tribunal the following 
month. He quickly pled not guilty, and 
his trial commenced on June 22, 2007. 
The trial concluded on September 17, 
2008 after testimony by nineteen wit-
nesses for the Prosecution and 24, includ-
ing Nsengimana, for the Defense.
The allegations against Nsengimana 
included individual criminal responsibility 
— through planning, instigating, ordering, 
committing, and aiding and abetting — 
for the killing of Tutsi priests, students, 
women, children, refugees, and a judge 
between April 6 and May 31, 1994. In 
addition, Nsengimana was charged on the 
theory of superior responsibility for the 
genocidal acts of employees and students 
at the Collège as well as members of Les 
Dragons, or Escadrons de la Mort, a band 
of Hutu extremists in Nyanza for whom the 
priest was alleged to have been a spiritual 
advisor.
The Chamber quickly disposed of the 
charge of superior responsibility, find-
ing the evidence insufficient to establish 
Nsengimana’s effective control over stu-
dents and staff at Collège Christ-Roi during 
the genocide. Notably, the Chamber found 
that Nsengimana did hold de jure authority 
over the Collège community. However, not-
ing the “vital role” played by other civilian 
superiors who were deemed responsible 
for the acts of the principal perpetrators 
of the relevant crimes, the Chamber found 
the priest’s de jure authority insufficient 
by itself to establish effective control. 
Moreover, although he met frequently with 
members of Collège staff known to have 
committed a number of killings, the evi-
dence failed to prove that Nsengimana 
exercised sufficient control over these staff 
members to support a finding of de facto 
authority. The Chamber also found no 
direct evidence of the priest’s “spiritual 
authority” over any of the assailants during 
the course of the killings in April and May 
1994. Thus, the Prosecution failed to prove 
that Nsengimana was responsible for the 
actions of his students or staff.
With regard to the accused’s alleged 
direct responsibility for genocide, the 
Prosecutor charged that Nsengimana was 
involved in both planning and carrying 
out genocidal acts. With respect to plan-
ning, the Prosecution alleged that, between 
1990 and May 1994, Nsengimana met 
with Hutu extremists implicated in the 
killing of Tutsis in April and May 1994 
and that, by virtue of his role as spiritual 
advisor to these Hutus, the accused played 
a prominent role in planning the genocidal 
acts. However, the Chamber found insuf-
ficient evidence to support finding beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the accused partici-
pated in such meetings. The Chamber also 
found insufficient evidence to support the 
Prosecution’s allegation that Nsengimana 
played a role in stockpiling machetes at the 
Collège between 1991 and April 1994.
With regard to the accused’s participa-
tion in acts of genocide in April and May 
1994, the Prosecution specifically alleged 
that the priest was involved in: (1) the 
killing by several Collège employees of a 
number of Tutsi civilians in the Mugonzi 
cellule following a meeting at or near the 
Collège on May 3, 1994; (2) the removal 
of three Tutsi priests from an orphanage 
in Nyanza on May 4 and their subsequent 
murder at a roadblock; (3) the abduction 
and murder of Xavérine and her son from 
the École Normale Primaire; (4) the kill-
ing of Callixte Kayitsinga, a Tutsi who 
sought refuge at the Collège, by a Collège 
employee, Phénéas Munyarubuga; (5) the 
killing of Judge Jean-Baptiste Twagirayezu 
behind the Nyanza parish church imme-
diately after he left Collège Christ-Roi; 
and (6) the abduction and murder of Tutsi 
civilians, including eight children, from 
the Don Bosco orphanage on May 22. The 
Trial Chamber found that the perpetra-
tors intentionally killed Tutsis in each of 
these episodes and that the perpetrators 
intended to destroy the Tutsi group in 
whole or in substantial part. However, the 
Chamber also found no credible evidence 
to support the Prosecutor’s allegations that 
Nsengimana planned, ordered, instigated, 
or committed these attacks. The Chamber 
noted that “[w]hile [Nsengimana] was seen 
on occasion in the company of local gov-
ernment or security officials at roadblocks, 
these sightings do not compel the conclu-
sion that he invariably supported any of the 
killings charged against him.”
On the second and third counts of the 
Indictment — murder and extermination as 
crimes against humanity — the Prosecutor 
relied on the same events as above. Again, 
the Chamber found ample proof that the 
widespread killings of Tutsi in Nyanza, 
Butare prefecture, and Rwanda more gen-
erally in April and May 1994 constituted 
crimes against humanity. But the evidence 
again failed to establish Nsengimana’s 
criminal liability for any of the killings.
The priest’s acquittal was announced a 
day after another prominent alleged geno-
cidaire was also acquitted. The decisions 
sparked immediate protests and accusa-
tions of “malpractice” and lax efforts by 
the Prosecution from victims’ advocates in 
Kigali. In late March 2010, Nsengimana 
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was transferred out of East Africa; once 
more a free man, he has resumed pastoral 
duties in a village in northern Italy.
Cyrena Khoury, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, wrote this 
judgment summary for the Human Rights 
Brief. Susana SáCouto, Director of the War 
Crimes Research Office, and Katherine 
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War 
Crimes Research Office, edited this sum-
mary for the Human Rights Brief.
sentencing JuDgment summaRy: tHe 
pROsecutOR v. micHel BagaRagaza, 
case nO. ictR 05-86-t
On November 5, 2009, ICTR Trial 
Chamber III sentenced Michel Bagaragaza 
to eight years in prison, with a credit 
for time already served. The Chamber 
imposed the sentence after accepting a plea 
bargain on September 17, 2009, through 
which Bagaragaza agreed to plead guilty 
to complicity in genocide.
Bagaragaza was born in 1945 in 
the commune of Giciye in the Gisenyi 
Prefecture of Rwanda. Before the genocide 
began in April 1994, he was a member of 
Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour 
le Développement (MRND), the Rwandan 
political party led by President Juvenal 
Habyarimana. Bagaragaza was also a 
member of the Akazu, a group of power-
ful Rwandans who formed Habyarimana’s 
inner circle. As a result of his political con-
nections, Bagaragaza was chosen to direct 
the Rwandan Tea Authority, an industry 
comprised of eleven tea factories and over 
55,000 workers.
Bagaragaza was initially indicted by the 
ICTR on three counts: conspiracy to com-
mit genocide; genocide; and complicity in 
genocide as an alternative to the second 
count. He voluntarily surrendered to the 
ICTR on August 15, 2005 and, at his initial 
appearance before the Tribunal, pled not 
guilty to each of the charges. He was then 
transferred to the detention facility of the 
ICTY in The Hague due to security prob-
lems arising from his decision to volun-
tarily surrender. On February 13, 2006, the 
Prosecutor moved to transfer Bagaragaza’s 
trial to Norway pursuant to Rule 11bis of 
the ICTR’s Rules of Procure, which allows 
a Trial Chamber “to refer a case to a com-
petent national jurisdiction for trial if it 
is satisfied that the accused will receive 
a fair trial and that the death penalty will 
not be imposed or carried out.” However, 
the Chamber presiding over Bagaragaza’s 
case denied the motion on the ground that 
Norway did not have any provision against 
genocide in its domestic criminal law. On 
April 13, 2007, the Chamber granted a 
motion for the trial to be transferred to the 
Netherlands, but rescinded its approval just 
days later on the advice of the Netherlands’ 
justice ministry, which had cast doubt on 
whether its courts could successfully try 
the case. Finally, days before Bagaragaza’s 
trial was to commence before the ICTR, 
the Prosecutor and Defense reached a plea 
agreement in which Bagaragaza would 
plead to complicity in genocide, and sub-
mitted it to the Trial Chamber.
In the plea agreement, Bagaragaza 
admitted that he “substantially contributed 
to the massacre of more than one thousand 
members of the Tutsi ethnic group who had 
sought refuge at Kesho Hill, in the Kabaya 
area, and at Nyundo Cathedral in Gisenyi 
préfecture.” Specifically, after meeting 
with MRND leaders who advocated com-
mitting genocide against Tutsis and sym-
pathetic Hutus in April 1994, Bagaragaza 
directed his subordinates to stockpile 
weapons and other supplies in several tea 
factories. Bagaragaza also arranged for a 
local Interahamwe chapter to be trained 
and equipped in Gisenyi prefecture. After 
the outbreak of violence, Bagaragaza pro-
vided additional assistance to a number of 
other Interahamwe units, repeatedly direct-
ing his subordinates to give Interahamwe 
members fuel and vehicles from factory 
stockpiles in order to enable them to com-
mit genocidal acts against the Tutsis tak-
ing refuge at Kesho Hill and Nyundo 
Cathedral. Bagaragaza also directed his 
subordinates to supply the Interahamwe 
with alcohol in order to encourage indi-
vidual members to continue their attacks 
in other regions.
As reviewed by the Trial Chamber, the 
jurisprudence of the ICTR has defined 
complicity in genocide as aiding and abet-
ting, instigating, or procuring acts of geno-
cide. While acts constituting aiding and 
abetting may occur at the planning, prepa-
ration, or execution stage of the crime, 
or after the act of the principal offender, 
the accomplice must carry out an act of 
“substantial practical assistance, encour-
agement, or moral support to the principal 
offender, culminating in the latter’s actual 
commission of the crime.” Thus, although 
the assistance “need not be indispensable 
to the crime, it must have a substantial 
effect on the commission of the crime.” In 
terms of mens rea, complicity by aiding 
and abetting requires only that the accom-
plice was aware of the specific genocidal 
intent of the principal perpetrators; it is 
not necessary that the accomplice himself 
shared that genocidal intent.
Based on the admissions of Bagaragaza 
in the plea agreement submitted by the 
parties, the Trial Chamber determined that 
he substantially assisted the killings of 
more than 1,000 Tutsis in Gisenyi, with 
the knowledge of the perpetrators’ intent, 
and thus the Chamber accepted the plea 
agreement. It then went on to determine an 
appropriate sentence based on the gravity 
of the crime and aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors. First, the Chamber acknowl-
edged that the crime of genocide is par-
ticularly heinous and repugnant within 
human society. However, the Chamber 
cited evidence that Bagaragaza did not per-
sonally plan or execute any of the attacks, 
and did not share the genocidal intent held 
by the MRND and Interahamwe members 
whom he assisted. Second, the Chamber 
noted that the Prosecutor did not enter any 
aggravating factors into the record. Third, 
the Chamber discussed a variety of miti-
gating factors. For instance, Bagaragaza 
had not shown any personal animosity or 
bias towards Tutsis before the outbreak of 
violence. He did not refuse to engage in 
business dealings with Tutsis, and he had 
two children with a Tutsi mother who he 
sheltered throughout the genocide. Also, 
as mentioned before, his actions were 
not motivated by an intention to commit 
genocide against the Tutsis. Instead, the 
Chamber found it more likely that he acted 
out of concern for the safety of his family. 
Additional mitigating factors to which the 
Chamber gave credence were the fact that 
Bagaragaza voluntarily surrendered, con-
fessed to the crime of complicity in geno-
cide, and demonstrated remorse for his 
role in the genocide. Lastly, the Chamber 
gave significant weight to Bagaragaza’s 
commitment to cooperating with the 
Prosecutor, noting that Bagaragaza had 
agreed to provide the Prosecutor with 
information about other responsible par-
ties and had testified for the Prosecution 
in the trial against Protais Zigiranyirazo, 
President Habyarimana’s brother-in-law.
In addition to the gravity of the offense 
and aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, the Chamber recognized that its 
sentence must comport with goals of pun-
3
Maitland et al.: Updates from the International and Internationalized Criminal Cou
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2010
56
ishment such as retribution, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and protection of society. In 
light of the severity of the crime of geno-
cide, the Chamber was primarily concerned 
with the first two goals. Furthermore, it 
found that rehabilitation and protection 
of society were less important because 
Bagaragaza was an elderly family man who 
expressed remorse in his actions. Finally, 
the Chamber considered sentences handed 
down in past cases from the ICTR and the 
ICTY.
The Prosecutor and Defense jointly 
submitted a sentence recommendation of 
six-to-ten years in prison. Although the 
Chamber noted that it was not required to 
abide by the recommendation, it ultimately 
followed the joint recommendation by sen-
tencing Bagaragaza to eight years in prison.
Paul Rinefierd, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, wrote this judgment summary for 
the Human Rights Brief. Susana SáCouto, 
Director of the War Crimes Research 
Office, and Katherine Anne Cleary, 
Assistant Director of the War Crimes 
Research Office, edited this summary for 
the Human Rights Brief.
iNterNatioNal crimiNal court
icc pROsecutOR initiates investigatiOn 
Of electiOn viOlence in kenya
On March 31, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber 
II authorized the Prosecutor’s investiga-
tion into the 2007 post-election violence in 
Kenya that resulted in over 1,100 deaths, 
hundreds of rapes, and the displacement 
of at least 350,000 people. Though the 
Kenyan government chose not to refer the 
situation to the ICC, the Prosecutor has 
gathered enough facts to support a reason-
able basis for the belief that crimes against 
humanity were committed in the weeks 
following Kenya’s 2007 presidential elec-
tion. This marks the first time that the ICC 
Prosecutor has personally referred a situa-
tion to the ICC for an investigation, instead 
of a referral from the UN Security Council 
or a State Party to the Rome Statute.
After the victory of the incumbent, 
Mwai Kibaki, in Kenya’s December 2007 
presidential election, civil unrest broke out 
as ethnic Luo supporters of his opponent, 
Raila Odinga, accused Kibaki and his 
ethnic Kikuyu support base of corruption. 
Violence between the Kikuyu and Luo 
tribes escalated, until Kibaki and Odinga 
opted to form a unity government at the 
urging of former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan. Though the new administra-
tion intended to establish a tribunal to pros-
ecute those who organized and financed 
the violence, Kenya’s parliament failed to 
conduct a successful vote to establish such 
a tribunal. Meanwhile, throughout 2008, 
the ICC Prosecutor collected a great deal 
of information from human rights workers, 
journalists, and diplomats about what had 
occurred. While visiting Kenya to speak 
with President Kibaki and Prime Minister 
Odinga in November 2009, the Prosecutor 
expressed his intention to refer the situa-
tion to the ICC through his authority under 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute to refer 
situations proprio motu. He filed his 1,500-
page request on November 26.
The Pre-Trial Chamber’s three-judge 
panel approved the Prosecutor’s request 
on March 31 in a two-to-one decision. The 
majority found that the facts provided by 
the Prosecutor met the low “reasonable 
basis for belief ” standard of proof required 
to approve an investigation, agreeing that 
he had established a reasonable basis to 
believe that the widespread, systematic, 
and ethnically-based targeting of victims 
by well-organized groups may constitute 
crimes against humanity. However, dissent-
ing Judge Hans-Peter Kaul did not agree 
that the incidents could amount to crimes 
against humanity. Specifically, Judge Kaul 
did not find that the suspected parties acted 
as a “state” or pursuant to any state-like 
“organizational policy” as specified in 
Article 7(2)(a) of the Statute, and there-
fore, they could not be investigated under 
the ICC’s jurisdiction.
Following the March 31 decision, the 
Prosecutor submitted a list of twenty sus-
pects to the Pre-Trial Chamber, but the 
names have yet to be publically released. 
The list includes prominent businessmen 
and politicians, some currently in office, 
who are accused of funding and orchestrat-
ing the crimes. Kenyan Justice Minister 
Mutula Kilonzo welcomed the investiga-
tion, and some politicians suspected of 
involvement in the violence have expressed 
their willingness to face the Court.
Chris Valvardi, a J.D. candidate at 
the American University Washington 
College of Law, wrote this column on 
the International Criminal Court for the 
Human Rights Brief.
icc JuDge ORDeRs Release Of 
inteRmeDiaRy’s iDentity
On March 15, 2010, the ICC Judge 
Adrian Fulford ordered the identity of an 
intermediary be disclosed to the defense, 
an event that may help Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo’s defense team refute testimony of 
prosecution witnesses regarding Lubanga’s 
involvement in recruiting child soldiers. 
Lubanga, according to the Prosecution, 
was a Union des Patriotes Congolais 
(UPC) leader in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, and is accused of conscripting 
children under the age of fifteen years 
into armed groups, enlisting children into 
armed groups and using children to par-
ticipate actively in armed conflict. His 
trial, the first-ever before the ICC, began 
on January 26, 2008. The intermediary 
in question is accused of bribing various 
people in the town of Bunia to falsely 
implicate Lubanga. The order to release 
the intermediary’s identity came after the 
defense’s tenth witness had testified behind 
closed doors.
According to the Head of the 
Jurisdiction Complementarity and 
Cooperation Division of the Office of 
the Prosecutor (OTP), Béatrice Le Fraper 
du Hellen, “Intermediaries are people in 
the field who put the OTP in contact 
with potential sources and witnesses, and 
describe to the OTP the situation on the 
ground.” Suggesting they are rarely used 
in trial proceedings, she further stated that 
intermediaries are not investigators and are 
never called as witnesses. The Prosecution 
says it is in the process of appealing this 
ruling. The Prosecution’s Mahoj Sachdeva 
said the disclosure would have “grave con-
sequences in terms of the potential safety 
of our intermediaries.”
On March 17, the Defense called a 
former Prosecution witness, who admitted 
to the Court last June that he fabricated 
testimony. Referred to as “Witness 15,” he 
stated that an intermediary encouraged him 
to lie before he talked to OTP investigators. 
Reports are unclear as to whether it is the 
same intermediary whose identity is to be 
released. In 2005, “Witness 15” told inves-
tigators that military training camps run by 
the UPC indoctrinated children as young as 
twelve years old and that he frequently saw 
UPC commanders go to the UPC head-
quarters to meet with Lubanga. However, 
he then recanted, stating that he was never 
a soldier and never saw UPC commanders 
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meet with Lubanga. His testimony contin-
ued into the following week.
This evidence and the release of the 
intermediary’s identity are part of the 
Defense’s overall strategy to prove that 
Prosecution witnesses knowingly testified 
to false information with the encourage-
ment of intermediaries. According to its 
opening statement on January 27, 2010, 
the Defense hopes the Court will stop the 
case due to abuse of process. However, if 
the case continues, the Defense will argue 
that Lubanga “did not take deliberate part 
in the common plan to recruit minors” and 
that he attempted to demobilize the minors 
who had joined the Patriotic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo.
John Coleman, a J.D. candidate at 
the American University Washington 
College of Law, wrote this column on 
the International Criminal Court for the 
Human Rights Brief.
suDan’s pResiDent may still face 
cHaRges Of genOciDe
In March 2009, the ICC issued its 
first arrest warrant for a sitting head of 
state, approving the Prosecutor’s applica-
tion for the arrest of Sudanese President 
Omar al-Bashir on charges arising out 
of the situation in Darfur. The charges 
initially brought against Bashir included 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide; however, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
originally rejected the counts of genocide 
proposed by the Prosecutor. Recently, the 
Appeals Chamber determined that those 
counts were rejected under an incorrect 
legal standard, and directed the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to re-examine the possibility of 
holding Bashir accountable for state-spon-
sored genocide. As yet, no date has been 
set for the Pre-Trial Chamber to revisit 
the issue. The decision puts further weight 
behind efforts to bring Bashir before the 
Court and further refines the ICC’s thresh-
old for attributing genocidal intent to high-
ranking government leaders.
The UN Security Council’s referral of 
the Darfur situation to the ICC through 
Resolution 1593 did not explicitly address 
the subject of genocide; however, the 
Prosecutor’s July 2008 warrant application 
tied a large number of crimes against the 
residents of Darfur to genocidal intent at 
the highest levels of the Sudanese govern-
ment. The warrant application listed three 
counts of genocide among the ten counts 
against Bashir, noting that he used the 
state apparatus to kill members of three 
targeted non-Arab ethnic groups; to inflict 
serious physical and mental harm through 
rape, torture, and displacement; and to 
deliberately inflict conditions of life calcu-
lated to destroy those groups. To meet the 
“reasonable grounds” standard required for 
issuance of a warrant under Article 58 of 
the Rome Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
has to infer genocidal intent from the facts 
produced by the investigation.
Despite the Prosecutor’s efforts, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber decided to issue the 
initial arrest warrant without the geno-
cide counts. The Chamber explained that, 
although the results of the investigation 
may have supported counts of genocide, 
those results could also support various 
other inferences, and did not conclusively 
establish the reasonable likelihood of geno-
cidal intent. The Prosecutor requested and 
received permission to appeal this decision 
in order to resolve uncertainty as to the 
standard of proof.
Subsequently, the Appeals Chamber 
held that the Pre-Trial Chamber acted 
erroneously in basing its rejection of the 
genocide counts on the grounds that geno-
cide was not the only possible conclusion. 
The Chamber distinguished the Article 58 
“reasonable grounds for belief ” standard 
from higher standards necessary to con-
firm charges or obtain a conviction. The 
Appeals Chamber found that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s reasoning too closely approxi-
mated the “beyond reasonable doubt” stan-
dard required for conviction, rather than 
the less restrictive “reasonable grounds” 
standard for the issuance of the arrest war-
rant.
The Appeals Chamber did not go so 
far as to approve the addition of the geno-
cide counts, instead remanding the case to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber. Meanwhile, Bashir 
received overwhelming support in Sudan’s 
presidential elections in April — the coun-
try’s first democratic elections in 24 years 
— primarily because the major opposi-
tion party in Southern Sudan boycotted 
the election and hundreds of thousands of 
Darfurians are not registered voters.
Chris Valvardi, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of 
Law, wrote this column on the International 
Criminal Court for the Human Rights 
Brief.  HRB
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